ΕΛ EN
Home | People | Ilia, Panagiotis
24
Scholarly Works
33%
OA Ratio
71%
Collaborative Ratio
Scholar

Ilia, Panagiotis

Lecturer

Department of Electrical Engineering, Computer Engineering and Informatics

16
H-index (Scopus)
1181
Scholar Citations

Scholarly Works

Research Output

Recent Publications

Health Hazard, Handle with Care: Investigating the Privacy Risks of Android's Health Connect

K Spyridakis, I Arkalakis, M Diamantaris, S Ioannidis, J Polakis, P Ilia
Publishing year: 2026
Conference paper
35th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 26), 2665-2684, 2026, 2026
Google Scholar

Abandon All Hope Ye Who Enter Here: A Dynamic, Longitudinal Investigation of Android's Data Safety Section

Arkalakis, Ioannis, Diamantaris, Michalis, Ilia, Panagiotis, Ioannidis, Sotiris, Moustakas, Serafeim, Polakis, Jason
Publishing year: 2024
Conference paper
USENIX Security Symposium, 2024
Repository
Users’ growing concerns about online privacy have led to increased platform support for transparency and consent in the web and mobile ecosystems. To that end, Android recently mandated that developers must disclose what user data their applications collect and share, and that information is made available in Google Play’s Data Safety section. In this paper, we provide the first large-scale, in-depth investigation on the veracity of the Data Safety section and its use in the Android application ecosystem. We build an automated analysis framework that dynamically exercises and analyzes applications so as to uncover discrepancies between the applications’ behavior and the data practices that have been reported in their Data Safety section. Our study on almost 5K applications uncovers a pervasive trend of incomplete disclosure, as 81% misrepresent their data collection and sharing practices in the Data Safety section. At the same time, 79.4% of the applications with incomplete disclosures do not ask the user to provide consent for the data they collect and share, and 78.6% of those that ask for consent disregard the users’ choice. Moreover, while embedded third-party libraries are the most common offender, Data Safety discrepancies can be traced back to the application’s core code in 41% of the cases. Crucially, Google’s documentation contains various “loopholes” that facilitate incomplete disclosure of data practices. Overall, we find that in its current form, Android’s Data Sa...

Unleash the Simulacrum: Shifting Browser Realities for Robust Extension-Fingerprinting Prevention

Doupé A., Polakis J., Shoshitaishvili Y., Ilia P., Trickel E., Kalantari F., Karami S., Zaeifi M., Maso X.J.
Publishing year: 2022
Conference paper
Proceedings of the 31st Usenix Security Symposium Security 2022, 2022
Scopus
Pages 735-752
Online tracking has garnered significant attention due to the privacy risk it poses to users. Among the various approaches, techniques that identify which extensions are installed in a browser can be used for fingerprinting browsers and tracking users, but also for inferring personal and sensitive user data. While preventing certain fingerprinting techniques is relatively simple, mitigating behavior-based extension-fingerprinting poses a significant challenge as it relies on hiding actions that stem from an extension's functionality. To that end, we introduce the concept of DOM Reality Shifting, whereby we split the reality users experience while browsing from the reality that webpages can observe. To demonstrate our approach we develop Simulacrum, a prototype extension that implements our defense through a targeted instrumentation of core Web API interfaces. Despite being conceptually straightforward, our implementation highlights the technical challenges posed by the complex and often idiosyncratic nature and behavior of web applications, modern browsers, and the JavaScript language. We experimentally evaluate our system against a state-of-the-art DOM-based extension fingerprinting system and find that Simulacrum readily protects 95.37% of susceptible extensions. We then identify trivial modifications to extensions that enable our defense for the majority of the remaining extensions. To facilitate additional research and protect users from privacy-invasive behaviors we will...

The Dangers of Human Touch: Fingerprinting Browser Extensions through User Actions

Nikiforakis N., Polakis J., Ilia P., Karami S., Solomos K.
Publishing year: 2022
Conference paper
Proceedings of the 31st Usenix Security Symposium Security 2022, 2022
Scopus
Pages 717-733
Browser extension fingerprinting has garnered considerable attention recently due to the twofold privacy loss that it incurs. Apart from facilitating tracking by augmenting browser fingerprints, the list of installed extensions can be directly used to infer sensitive user characteristics. However, prior research was performed in a vacuum, overlooking a core dimension of extensions' functionality: how they react to user actions. In this paper, we present the first exploration of user-triggered extension fingerprinting. Guided by our findings from a large-scale static analysis of browser extensions we devise a series of user action templates that enable dynamic extension-exercising frameworks to comprehensively uncover hidden extension functionality that can only be triggered through user interactions. Our experimental evaluation demonstrates the effectiveness of our proposed technique, as we are able to fingerprint 4,971 unique extensions, 36% of which are not detectable by state-of-the-art techniques. To make matters worse, we find that ˜67% of the extensions that require mouse or keyboard interactions lack appropriate safeguards, rendering them vulnerable to pages that simulate user actions through JavaScript. To assist extension developers in protecting users from this privacy threat, we build a tool that automatically includes origin checks for fortifying extensions against invasive sites.

Phish in Sheep's Clothing: Exploring the Authentication Pitfalls of Browser Fingerprinting

Polakis J., Ilia P., Solanki S., Lin X.
Publishing year: 2022
Conference paper
Proceedings of the 31st Usenix Security Symposium Security 2022, 2022
Scopus
Pages 1651-1668
As users navigate the web they face a multitude of threats; among them, attacks that result in account compromise can be particularly devastating. In a world fraught with data breaches and sophisticated phishing attacks, web services strive to fortify user accounts by adopting new mechanisms that identify and prevent suspicious login attempts. More recently, browser fingerprinting techniques have been incorporated into the authentication workflow of major services as part of their decision-making process for triggering additional security mechanisms (e.g., two-factor authentication). In this paper we present the first comprehensive and in-depth exploration of the security implications of real-world systems relying on browser fingerprints for authentication. Guided by our investigation, we develop a tool for automatically constructing fingerprinting vectors that replicate the process of target websites, enabling the extraction of fingerprints from users' devices that exactly match those generated by target websites. Subsequently, we demonstrate how phishing attackers can replicate users' fingerprints on different devices to deceive the risk-based authentication systems of high-value web services (e.g., cryptocurrency trading) to completely bypass two-factor authentication. To gain a better understanding of whether attackers can carry out such attacks, we study the evolution of browser fingerprinting practices in phishing websites over time. While attackers do not generally col...

Escaping the Confines of Time: Continuous Browser Extension Fingerprinting Through Ephemeral Modifications

Ilia, Panagiotis, Nikiforakis, Nick, Polakis, Jason, Solomos, Konstantinos
Publishing year: 2022
Conference paper
Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, 2022
Repository
Browser fingerprinting continues to proliferate across the web. Critically, popular fingerprinting libraries have started incorporating extension-fingerprinting capabilities, thus exacerbating the privacy loss they can induce. In this paper we propose continuous fingerprinting, a novel extension fingerprinting technique that captures a critical dimension of extensions' functionality that allowed them to elude all prior behavior-based techniques. Specifically, we find that ephemeral modifications are prevalent in the extension ecosystem, effectively rendering such extensions invisible to prior approaches that are confined to analyzing snapshots that capture a single moment in time. Accordingly, we develop Chronos, a system that captures the modifications that occur throughout an extension's life cycle, enabling it to fingerprint extensions that make transient modifications that leave no visible traces at the end of execution. Specifically, our system creates behavioral signatures that capture nodes being added to or removed from the DOM, as well as changes being made to node attributes. Our extensive experimental evaluation highlights the inherent limits of prior snapshot-based approaches, as Chronos is able to identify 11,219 unique extensions, increasing coverage by 66.9% over the state of the art. Additionally, we find that our system captures a unique modification event (i.e., mutation) for 94% of the extensions, while also being able to resolve 97% of the signature collis...

24
Unique publications
33.3%
Open access (8 publications; 1 without information)
70.8%
With other institutions (17 publications; 1 without information)

H-Index Reports

Index type Scopus Google Scholar Web of Science
H-index 16 19 1
H5-index 7 7 0
H10-index 14 17 1

Publications per year and source

No description yet.
Faculty
Faculty of Engineering and Technology
Department
Department of Electrical Engineering, Computer Engineering and Informatics
Title
Lecturer